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Abstract
In the context of increasing digitalization and networking, the importance of cyber security for family businesses is also growing and is moving onto
the management agenda as a cross-divisional,
group-wide challenge. A study of 184 German companies shows that although family businesses identify cyber security as a relevant field of action, they
do not take sufficient account of the organizational
framework and process implementation. This paper
is dedicated to the investigation of this phenomenon. Possible causes of this phenomenon are discussed. Based on this, recommendations for action
are given.

1. Introduction
In the course of increasing digitalization, family
businesses are also becoming an ever greater target for
hackers and are thus exposed to cyber attacks [1].
Since family businesses are known for their particular
ability to innovate and usually still cooperate, attackers can target their specialized knowledge as well as
understand that family businesses can be a useful
channel for larger organizations through the supply
chain. In addition, family businesses are often perceived to be insufficiently mature in the area of cyber
security [1]. As such, family businesses are attractive
targets for cyber attackers.
According to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), cybersecurity is the "ability
to protect or defend the organization from cyber attacks"[2]. A lack of protection against cyber attacks
can lead to business interruption or downtime, as well
as significant incident investigation and IT system recovery costs. Claims for damages against companies
due to delayed deliveries, damage due to data loss,
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damage to reputation [3] or disadvantages due to reduced competitiveness should also not be underestimated [4]. According to the results of a study by the
German Federal Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media
(BITKOM), the overall economic damage caused to
companies in Germany by cyber attacks in the last two
years amounts to 205.7 billion euros [5].
There is a discussion in the literature about the
"readiness" of German companies for cyber attacks.
Literature research [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] as well as empirical data [12, 13] show that a holistic approach [14,
15], which integrates cyber security into organizationwide procedures and processes, is particularly relevant
here. This means that even family businesses must
take measures not only at the technological level but
also at the organizational and process level to achieve
an appropriate level of cyber security. In order to secure an organization, all employees must act in a riskreducing manner. The organization can be seen as a
system consisting of complementary roles. The effectiveness of cybersecurity depends crucially on how explicitly the tasks are assigned to the various roles and
how motivated and capable the holders of these roles
are to perform the tasks assigned to them. Therefore,
the performance of employees is a function of both the
organization and the individual [16].
As organizational implementation measures to
avoid risks and to strengthen resistance in the event of
a cyber attack, internal rules, such as protocols and
guidelines, are essential in order to commit the members of the organization to certain procedures [17]. In
addition to organization charts, these internal guidelines define who is responsible for which intermediate
step and which areas are involved in decisions, and for
which forms of action it is ensured that the individual
measures are determined as planned. Structuring in
terms of responsibilities, communication and decision-making processes enables decision-makers to
take appropriate measures and make decisions even
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under time pressure [4]. This is the only way to limit
the damage caused by a cyber attack, which is ultimately unavoidable, and to ensure the fastest possible
uninterrupted continuation of business activities.
So far, there is little knowledge about the perception, dissemination and implementation of an organizational framework for cyber security in family businesses. However, earlier studies show that family businesses are generally less organized than non-family
businesses, e.g. family businesses use management
and management accounting tools to a lesser extent
and are less inclined to set up independent management accounting departments than non-family businesses [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Therefore, the focus of
this paper is on the following research question:
Do German family firms show peculiarities in regards to organizational cyber security in comparison
to non-family firms?
This paper examines this question on the basis of
an empirical survey of 184 German companies.
The further course of this paper is as follows:
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the relevant theoretical
foundations. Hypotheses are derived on this basis.
Subsequently, in chapter 4 the survey design and the
sample are described before the respective empirical
results are presented. In chapter 6, a short conclusion
is drawn and recommendations for action are given.

well placed to assert its own interests in the company.
This power of the entrepreneurial family can also have
a concrete impact on cyber security. In many cases, it
enables family members to access company information on an ad hoc basis. For example, if a family
member can spontaneously seek a conversation with
the CISO or another manager responsible for cyber security, the need for formal regular reporting is less. As
a third characteristic, family businesses place more
emphasis on non-financial aspects than non-family
businesses.
For example, many family businesses combine the
reputation of the company with the reputation of the
family. As a result, the non-financial goal of maintaining reputation is given significantly more weight than
in non-family businesses. The goal of preserving the
company for the next generation and passing it on to
the next generation, or other goals refer to values
within the company and to positive effects of the company on the family, such as strengthening family cohesion. In some cases, it may also be a family goal without regard to the economic impact - that cooperation within the company is based more on trust and less
on control. The way in which cyber security is managed is influenced by the specifics of family businesses and may be less formalized than in non-family
businesses, for example.

2. Theory

2.2 Organizational aspects of cyber security

2.1 Family businesses

It is necessary to enforce the cyber security process at
all levels and thus influence the organizational structure [31]. Different groups of experts need to work together to create both effective and efficient structures
for cyber-risk management, cyber-security control and
monitoring. The necessary cooperation of all actors involved must be organized in a consistent role and responsibility structure, especially to avoid gaps and
frictional losses [32]. In order to ensure that each individual project process complies with the company's
cyber-security guidelines, which have been issued
from the outset, it is first and foremost crucial to establish an organizational framework that is aligned
with the company's strategy; the translation of an abstract management task into an operational and structurally manageable material [33]. Depending on the
organization's own cyber security requirements, we
strongly recommend the use of frameworks such as
COBIT and COSO [14, 15] as a reference for building
an individual framework.

The term "family business" is not uniformly defined in the economic literature [24, 25], which makes
it difficult to quantify. Family businesses can be large
as well as small and medium-sized enterprises controlled by a family [26]. The main distinguishing feature of the criterion for defining family enterprises is
the level of ownership of the family [27, 28].
Due to the influence of the respective families,
family businesses have some qualitative peculiarities.
First, family businesses are known for their long-term
orientation compared to other companies. This is due
to the fact that many entrepreneurial families focus on
passing on the business to the next generation [29, 30].
As a rule, this means that long-term success is given
much more weight than short-term profit [30]. This
could have an impact on cyber security in that the family business is willing to make a high short-term investment in cyber security to protect intangible assets
in the long term. Second, family businesses differ from
publicly traded companies in the power or influence of
the entrepreneurial family. Compared to the power of
small shareholders in publicly traded companies, it is
significantly greater. The family is thus comparatively
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2.2.1 Process

2.2.2 CISO

In order to operate a proactive cyber risk management, the introduced process should include the following functions. First of all, it is crucial to perform
appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a
cyber security event or to determine the key cyber
risks, risk appetite, and assessment of controls and vulnerabilities [2, 10]. Therefore, it is primarily necessary
to define and understand the business model, business
objectives and assets of the organization in order to determine the relevance of IT to the business and ultimately agree on a level of cyber security [34, 35]. After the identified cyber risks and their relevance to the
organization have been analyzed, they must each be
quantified, assessed and evaluated in terms of probability of occurrence and potential impact [10], e.g. using a risk matrix [34, 35, 36]. From there, organizational measures can be developed and implemented to
address risks that exceed the risk appetite of the organization. In addition, it is imperative to continuously
monitor and proactively control cyber-risks in terms of
their relevance to the organization, including scheduled board-level status updates on top cyber-risks,
treatment strategy and remediation actions [10]. In addition, the adequacy of risk management measures
must be regularly reviewed (risk control) [34, 35, 36].
In addition, it is essential to develop and implement
appropriate activities to take action in response to a detected cyber security event [2]. This includes contingency planning, which, in addition to an emergency
team as a core element, includes the response plan for
cyber incidents. This plan defines immediate reactions
and contains specifications taking into account technical, organizational, communication and legal challenges [37].
This creates the prerequisite for the company not
being forced to act exclusively in a reactive manner,
but rather being able to control and act [4]. In addition,
the internal threat posed by human behavior should not
be neglected. Raising the cyber security awareness of
all employees, e.g. in the form of training and instructions [38], should be an essential part of a cross-company security concept. Finally, a set of policies, procedures, guidelines and standards is of little use if they
are not used and implemented by employees. In this
respect, the establishment of a cyber security culture
can make a decisive contribution to increasing cyberresilience and steering employee behavior in the right
direction [39].

To ensure effective and efficient prevention cyber
resilience, it must be clearly regulated and communicated who is responsible for cyber security at an operational management level. It should be mandatory to
establish a single point of contact for security issues,
coordination, management and communication of the
information security process [31]. In this context,
knowledge recording, knowledge sharing and succession planning to avoid critical dependencies on key
persons naturally also plays a major role [31]. Due to
the increasing demands on cyber security management
and its degree of complexity, more and more companies are not only adapting existing management positions, such as those of the CIO, but are also creating
new positions, such as the position of the CISO. The
CISO is usually responsible for implementing the
cyber security strategy. Thus the CISO does not only
have to take on responsibility as a technical manager
but rather as business visionary, innovator and strategist, driving both change and strategic initiatives [40].
A lot of leadership energy must be put into breaking
down the cultural barriers between IT and the core organization. CISOs therefore must educate the employees of the business potentials of technology to achieve
a change in mindset [41]. For this reason the CISO
should not only be an excellent communicator [40]. In
this respect expertise, credibility including stature and
prestige in the organization, political access to senior
management and control of rewards and sanctions are
key success factors [42].

3. Hypotheses
A possible cause for the existing phenomenon that
family businesses are well aware of the importance of
cyber security, but the degree of implementation of
measures and the establishment of systematic cyber
security management is insufficient, could be due to
the "socio-emotional wealth" (SEW) in family businesses.
The inventors of this approach postulate that in
family businesses the founding family sometimes does
things that are negative for the company. In contrast to
previous approaches, the SEW goes further in that it
does not generally assume that family businesses have
a more unprofessional approach. Rather, the point is
that family businesses are well aware in the area of
methods and instruments that their use can be positive
for the company. It is assumed, however, that the family does not use these instruments in some cases because the formalization that goes along with them
makes knowledge available to other decision makers
and therefore the position of the family in the company
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becomes less important. The SEW suspects that the
family is weighing up the pros and cons and deciding
against the continued existence of its own company
out of self-interest and thus by deliberately not implementing certain methods and instruments.
The origins of the SEW approach are related to the
emergence of research contributions from GómezMeija et al. [28], in which non-financial questions
were explained as the key to the performance of
family businesses, which were taken into account by
emotional requirements such as reputation issues, the
family friendliness itself and their influence on external factors and follow-up discussions [28].
Berrone et al. [43] prove that SEW is the most important characteristic parameter for explaining the
behavior of family businesses. Developments in thematically subdivided silos include among others risk
management [28] and organizational structure [44].
It is assumed that family businesses have the necessary knowledge in dealing with cyber security and
see the necessity of establishing a holistic approach
but refrain from implementing it for fear of losing control. This should explain why family members occasionally behave opportunistically; they do so in order
to protect their socio-emotional assets, even if this entails financial costs [45]. Instead of leveraging managerial levers in a way that builds a cyber security culture driving cyber security behavior to prevent, detect
and respond to cyber attacks effectively, family businesses are often prepared to take considerable business
risks by diversifying less, only to preserve SEW as a
consequence [43]. One reason for this is that owners
of a family business often associate their identity with
the organization, they are proud to be part of a family
business [30]. Usually the company even bears the
name of the family [43]. The possible sources of SEW
are manifold, taking into account authority and power,
status and prestige, succession and duty as well as capital formation and altruism [46].
Based on the SEW theory, the following hypotheses are formulated:
Previous studies show that family businesses devote fewer resources to training and attach less importance to education and have smaller proportion of
managers with a university degree. Furthermore they
give less importance to the improvement of detailed
and rigorous management planning and are prone to
underemploy management accounting techniques
[47]. Management accounting techniques are methodically structured tools that solve problems of management accounting and are usually supported by IT in
companies. Examples are investment calculations,
budgeting, transfer prices and the balanced scorecard.
This lack of formalization is argumentatively transferred to the field of cyber security.

Even though family businesses may be well aware
of the importance of cyber security, we therefore assume that they are not as well prepared in terms of having implemented a cyber incident response compared
to non-family businesses due to their fear of losing
control. The typical reaction to a cyber attack is a socalled cyber incident response plan (CIRP).
We therefore formulate as follows:
H1: Family businesses show lesser rates of implementation of a CIRP than non-family businesses.
Previous studies show that family businesses are
generally less sensitized to risks and their economic
evaluation in the area of risk management. This is
shown, among other things, by the fact that family
businesses, although they are generally more longterm oriented, do not implement this long-term orientation methodically. They use fewer methods and instruments such as scenario techniques, sensitivity
analyses and simulations. Fluctuation margins are less
often taken into account in planning [48]. For the present study, it is therefore assumed that family businesses are less aware of the significance of cyber risks
in the area of cyber security and therefore consider
them to be strategically less relevant for their company. Quantifiable risks are captured insufficiently, at
the most qualitatively clustered. We therefore formulate as follows:
H2: Family businesses quantitatively assess cyber
risks with less formal methods than non-family businesses.
Family businesses have implemented less formalized systems and are as well often lacking documentation and reporting compared to non-family businesses
[45]. Therefore, family businesses might be less sensitized to detecting security vulnerabilities.
We therefore formulate as follows:
H3: Family businesses are slower to detect security
vulnerabilities than non-family businesses.
Previous studies show that family-owned businesses are less likely to establish independent controlling departments than non-family businesses [8]. The
same applies to positions such as Chief Compliance
Officer (CCO) [49]. For the present study, it is therefore assumed that family businesses overall are less
differentiated in their organization and therefore do
not recruit a CISO either. We therefore formulate as
follows:
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H4: Family businesses are less likely to hire a CISO
than non-family businesses.

4. Methodology
4.1 Methodology and design
The data collection was carried out using a standardized online questionnaire with open and closed
questions. To check the questionnaire, a pre-test with
several test persons was first conducted. Two were
owners of family businesses, one was the CISO of a
family business and one was an IT consultant. Subsequently, the actual survey was conducted between October and December 2019. For this purpose, the e-mail
addresses of German companies were randomly selected in advance using the Nexis database, which includes both German family and non-family businesses. The study does not claim to be representative;
it aims to collect a broad opinion on cyber security.
The company sizes were limited to 50 employees and
10,000 workers.
A total of 14,495 companies were contacted by email, of which 1,612 e-mails could not be delivered.
Thus 12,883 companies received the link to the online
survey. The online questionnaire was accessed 415
times during the survey period, which corresponds to
a participation rate of 3.22 percent. 372 companies answered the questions asked, with 188 companies having ended the survey early (usage rate: 89.64 percent).
This brings the sample size to 184 companies and the
response rate to 1.43 percent. For the study, we conducted a test for non-response bias according to Armstrong/Overton (1977) [50] by examining the first and
last third of responses for differences in structure and
content. There was no evidence of bias.
In this context, it should be noted that individual
questions may nevertheless be mentioned differently,
as partial non-response (item non-response) was not
considered in this report. This is due to the fact that the
questionnaire was deliberately designed without the
specification of mandatory questions, since in some
cases very topic-specific and sensitive data was queried. The data was evaluated using Microsoft Excel
and SPSS.

4.2 Characterization of the sample
55 percent of the surveyed companies operate in
the legal form of a limited liability company (GmbH),
24 percent as a limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG),
6 percent of the companies to be examined wear the

legal form of a stock corporation (AG), 2 percent are
formed as a limited partnership (KG) and 1 percent as
an economic company constituted under civil law
(GbR). 11 percent state that they have a different legal
form.
24 percent of the companies are active in the service sector, 17 percent in mechanical and plant engineering and 9 percent in the automotive industry. 6
percent of the subject group are logistics companies, 3
percent medical technicians. The remaining 42 percent
are assigned to another industry.
In terms of company size, the surveyed companies
have an arithmetic mean of 714 million euros in terms
of turnover and an arithmetic mean of 974 employees
in terms of staff numbers.
54 percent of the companies surveyed are family
businesses. Therefore, 46 percent are non-family
firms.
The test persons were also asked to state their position in the company. Of the respondents, 54 percent
are employed in IT. 28 percent state that they belong
to company management. In addition, 4 percent work
in management accounting, 2 percent in human resources, another 2 percent in production and 9 percent
in other corporate areas.

4.3 Independent variables
The independent variable in the study is family influence. There are several operationalizations for this
variable in the literature [51] [52] [53] [54]. Since the
companies in the survey are primarily small and medium-sized enterprises and family businesses, which
tend to answer less when questions are too complex, a
single-item approach was chosen for the present study.
To measure family influence, a 0/1 coded question "Is
your company a family business" was used, which
yields the variable FAMILY. Of the 184 companies in
the study, 106 are family enterprises and 78 are nonfamily enterprises.

4.4 Dependent variables
A different dependent variable was defined for
each of the four hypotheses.
For H1 the dependent variable is the existence of a
reaction plan (REAC_PLAN). The variable was measured at binary level 0=no and 1=yes.
For H2 the dependent variable is whether there are
methods for cyber risk assessment (ASSESS_METH).
The issue was whether companies were using a cyberrisk measurement methodology with categories such
as high/medium/low or maturity models. This was also
measured in binary on the 0/1 scale.
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For H3 the dependent variable is SPEED. This variable was measured in four steps: 1=less than 1 day;
2=1-7 days; 3=1-4 weeks; 4=more than one month.
For H4 the dependent variable CISO. This variable
was again measured in binary at the 0/1 level.

(Wald test); ** Significance at the 5% level (Wald
test); *** Significance at the 1% level (Wald test).

5.1 Correlations

Table 1: correlations

Unfortunately, the target group of family businesses has a tendency to quickly abandon empirical
surveys in the case of many multi-item scales or ordinal variables. Measuring several variables using binary constructs is therefore a painful but necessary
compromise in questionnaire design and evaluation.

4.5 Control variables
As a control variable, as in other, organization-related studies [55], the company size was also chosen
as a complexity-generating factor. The size of the enterprise - variable SIZE - was operationalized by the
number of employees. The number of employees was
surveyed in four classes:
- SIZE_99: enterprises with up to 99 employees
(n=34);
- SIZE_100_999: enterprises with between 100
and 999 employees (n=122);
- SIZE_1000_9999: companies with between
1,000 and 9,999 employees (n=17);
- SIZE_10000: enterprises with 10,000 or more
employees (n=4).
The class up to 99 employees was chosen as the
reference class.

Table 1 shows the correlations in the sample. At
first glance, family businesses seem to have a response
plan less frequently, a method for assessing cyberrisks less frequently and CISO less frequently. Companies with more than 1,000 employees are more
likely to have formal assessment methods. Companies
with more than 1,000 employees also have more frequent CISOs. The emergency response plan, the assessment and the CISO variable correlate significantly.

5.2 Test of hypothesis 1
A binary logistic regression was created for H1.
Table 2: Test of hypothesis 1

MODEL 1
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
FAMILY

REAC_PLAN
ß-Coeff.
-0.762

Sig.
0.021

SIZE100_999

0.341

0.371

SIZE1000_9999

0.141

0.817

SIZE10000

0.625

0.607

5. Empirical Results

Constant

0.890

0.020

Various regression models were used to test the hypotheses depending on the scale level of the dependent
variables. The following section first shows the correlations of the variables processed in the study. For each
logistic regression model, the ß-coefficient describes
the regression coefficient of logistic regression, and
Sig. shows the probability of the Wald statistics. As
for the significances: * Significance at the 10% level

-2LL

**

Model fit
228.813

Cox and Snell R²

0.034

Nagelkerkes R²

0.047

The model quality and the explanatory contribution in this model are not particularly good at just 3.4
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percent. Nevertheless, it is shown that family businesses have a significantly lower probability of having
an emergency response plan. H1 is confirmed.

5.5 Test of hypothesis 4
A binary logistic regression was used for hypothesis 4.

5.3 Test of hypothesis 2
Table 5: Test of hypothesis 4

A binary logistic regression was created for H2.
Table 3: Test of hypothesis 2

Model 4
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
FAMILY

Model 2
Dependent Variable

ß-Coeff.
-1.273

Sig.
0.007

0.709

0.288

SIZE1000_9999

2.003

0.013

SIZE10000

23.973

0.999

Constant

-1.995

0.001

SIZE100_999

ASSESS_METH

Independent Variable
FAMILY

ß-Coeff.
-1.264

Sig.
0.005

SIZE100_999

0.048

0.933

SIZE1000_9999

1.419

0.049

**

SIZE10000

2.046

0.078

*

Constant

-1.414

0.005

***

CISO
***

**

Model fit
-2LL

130.469

Cox and Snell R²

0.150

Nagelkerkes R²

0.258

Model fit
-2LL

140.489

Cox and Snell R²

0.086

Nagelkerkes R²

0.149

Family businesses are less likely to have assessment metrics for cyber risk. Larger companies with
more than 1,000 employees do. H2 is thus confirmed.
Goodness-of-fit for this model, measured with
Nagelkerkes r², is relatively good at 14.9 percent.

5.4 Test of hypothesis 3
A linear regression was performed for H3.
Table 4: Test of hypothesis 3
Model 3
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
FAMILY

SPEED
ß-Coeff.
0.069

p-Value
0.617

Tolerance
0.998

VIF
1.002

SIZE100_999

0.029

0.862

0.746

1.340

SIZE1000_9999

0.011

0.968

0.779

1.284

SIZE10000

0.748

0.120

0.931

1.074

Model fit
R²

0.015

Adjusted R²

-0.007

F (Model, global)

0.682

The model does not provide sufficient model quality and there are no significant results. H3 is rejected.
In addition, the adjusted r² shows that the model is not
really well suited to analyze this question.

Model 4 delivers the expected results. Family businesses have significantly less CISO. In contrast, companies with more than 1,000 employees have a CISO
more often. H4 is confirmed. In addition, the goodness-of-fit – measured with Nagelkerkes r² - is relatively good at 25.8 percent.

6. Discussion and conclusion
For companies of all sizes, information has become
a decisive competitive factor, which they protect intensively. Literature research and empirical data show
that this protection must not only meet technical, but
above all organizational requirements.
The present study examined the status quo of organizational cyber security at 184 German companies.
The manuscript thus moves in an interesting field
of tension between family businesses, SMEs, organizational routines and cyber security. Even though it
has already been established that there is still some
catching up to do in the area of cyber security in the
Anglo-American and SME sector, we do not believe
that German companies or the subgroup of family
businesses have been influenced in this way in the literature to date.
It is confirmed that family businesses do indeed
have organizational catch-up needs to reduce their vulnerability to cyber attacks. The hypotheses regarding
the influence of family influence have been largely
confirmed. Family businesses and non-family businesses differ considerably in their assessment of cyber
risks. The same applies to the implementation of a plan
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to respond to cyber incidents. Furthermore, family
businesses are less likely to hire a CISO.
This could be the result of a fear of losing control.
Family members occasionally behave opportunistically to preserve their socio-emotional assets, even if
this involves financial costs.
Nevertheless, dealing with one's own level of cybersecurity maturity means that one has to measure
something - that one has some defined metrics. This
raises awareness. A process that needs to be repeated
regularly in order to reap the full benefits. That's why
risk assessment is crucial to prevent the company from
being compromised. This includes contingency planning, which includes an emergency team as well as the
response plan for cyber incidents as a core element.
This plan defines immediate responses and contains
specifications taking into account technical, organizational, communication and legal challenges [37],
which enable decision-makers to take appropriate
measures and make decisions even under time pressure. In addition, there must be someone in addition to
top management who assumes responsibility primarily
as a change agent. A so-called CISO, which primarily
educates employees about the business potential of
technology in order to achieve a change in mentality
that overcomes the cultural barriers between IT and
the core organization.
The results show that non-family businesses
clearly make a greater contribution to the holistic management of cyber risks and ensure that the process of
cyber security is enforced at all levels. We therefore
recommend that further research be conducted in this
area to derive measures and, based on this, to develop
tools that can help to further develop organizational
cyber security in family businesses.
From a theoretical point of view, it can be seen that
the view postulated in the SEW that family businesses
sometimes omit organizational aspects and routines in
order to maintain their own position in the family network can also be transferred to the area of cyber security. However, if the lack of formal routines in areas
such as management accounting or planning can be
compensated by informal mechanisms such as trust,
there is a suspicion that this will not be as successful
for cyber security. However, we did not discuss this in
the manuscript and unfortunately did not check it in
questions and variables in the underlying survey. This
should be an exciting question for qualitative and
quantitative follow-up studies.
Our study is subject to some limitations. These include the purely empirical approach with a rather low
response rate and the focus on German companies. A
national qualitative follow-up study as well as an international quantitative study will follow.

References
[1] P. Engermann, D. Fischer, B. Gosdzik, T. Koller, N.
Moore, Im Visier der Cyber-Gangster, So gefährdet ist
die Informationssicherheit im deutschen Mittelstand,
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers, Studienbericht, 2017.
[2] NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology,
“Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 2018.
[3] J. Byok, „Informationssicherheit von Kritischen Infrastrukturen im Wettbewerbs- und Vergaberecht“, Betriebs-Berater, 2017, pp. 451-454.
[4] D. Gabel, T. A. Heinrich, A. Kiefner, Rechtshandbuch
Cyber-Security, Deutscher Fachverlag GmbH, Fachmedien Recht und Wirtschaft, 2019.
[5] M. Barth, N. Hellemann, T. Kob, C. Krösmann, U. Morgenstern, T. Tscherich, T. Ritter, H. Shulman, D. Trapp,
R. Wintergerst, „Spionage, Sabotage und Diebstahl.
Wirtschaftsschutz in der vernetzten Welt, BITKOM e.
V. Studienbericht, 2020.
[6] M. Bartsch, S. Frey, Cybersecurity – Best Practices,
Springer, 2018.
[7] I. Corradini, E. Nardelli, “Building Organizational Risk
Culture in Cyber Security: The Role of Human Factors”, International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics, in Advances in Human Factors in
Cybersecurity, Springer, 2018, pp. 193-202.
[8] K. Hausken, “Cyber resilience in firms, organizations
and societies”, Internet of Things, Vol. 11, 2020 (forthcoming).
[9] S. Kraemer, P. Carayon, J. Clem, “Human and organizational factors in computer and information security:
Pathways to vulnerabilities”, Computers & Security 28.
2009, pp. 509 – 520.
[10] McKinsey & Company, Perspectives on transforming
cybersecurity, 2019.
[11] P. E. Roege, Z. A. Collier, V. Chevardin, P. Chouinard,
M. V. Florin, J. H. Lambert, K. Nielsen, M. Nogal, B.
Todorovic, Bridging the Gap from Cyber Security to
Resilience, in Resilience and Risk, Methods and Application in Environment, Cyber and Social Domains,
Nato Science for Peace and Security Series – C: Environmental Security, Springer, 2017.
[12] COSO Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission, Enterprise Risk Management –
Integrated Framework, 2017.
[13] ISACA Information Systems Audit and Control Association, Control Objectives for Information related
Technology (COBIT) – IT-Governance Framework,
2019.
[14] E. Kolek, “IT-Sicherheit der Digitalisierung in Kleinen
und Mittleren Unternehmen: Eine literaturbasierte und
empirische Studie von Effekten und Barrieren”, Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik, 2018, pp. 17061717.
[15] D. Wrede, T. Freers, J. M. Graf von der Schulenburg,
„Herausforderungen und Implikationen für das CyberRisikomanagement sowie die Versicherung von Cyberrisiken – Eine empirische Analyse.“, Zeitschrift für die
gesamte Versicherungswirtschaft, 107, pp. 405-434.

Page 6223

[16] T. M. Welbourne, D.E. Johnson and A. Erez, “The
Role-Based Measure”, Academy of Management Journal, vol. 41, no. 5, 1998, pp. 540-555.
[17] Bensinger/Kozok, “Kampf gegen Cyber Crime und
Hacker Angriffe”, Compliance Berater, 2015, pp. 376 380.
[18] W. Becker, P. Ulrich, M. Staffel, “Management accounting and controlling in German SMEs: do company size and family influence matter?”, International
Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing, Vol. 3 No. 3,
2011, pp. 28-300.
[19] M. R. W. Hiebl, „Einfluss von Controlling-Systemen
auf die Unternehmensführung mittelgroßer Familienunternehmen“, Controlling & Management Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2013, pp. 78-84.
[20] M. R. W. Hiebl, B. Feldbauer-Durstmüller, C. Duller,
„Die Organisation des Controllings in österreichischen
und bayerischen Familienunternehmen“, Zeitschrift für
KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 61, No. 1-2, 2013,
pp. 83-114.
[21] E. K. Laitinen, “Value drivers in Finnish family-owned
firms: profitability, growth and risk”, International
Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2008,
pp. 1–41.
[22] B. Feldbauer-Durstmüller, C. Duller, D. Greiling “Strategic Management Accounting in Austrian Family
Firms”, International Journal of Business Research,
Vol. 12, No. 1, 2012, pp. 26-42.
[23] B. Feldbauer-Durstmüller, T. Haas, S. Mühlböck,
„Controlling-Praxis oberösterreichischer Familien-unternehmen“, Controller Magazin, Vol 34, No. 2, 2009,
pp. 36-40.
[24] J. H. Astrachan, S. B. Klein, K. X. Smyrnios, “The FPEC scale of family influence: A proposal for solving
the family business definition problem”, Family Business Review, 15(1), 2002, pp. 45-58.
[25] J. H. Astrachan, M. C. Shanker, “Family businesses'
contribution to the U.S. economy: A closer look” Family Business Review, 16(3), 2003, pp. 211-219.
[26] M. Ayyagari, T. Beck, A. Demirguc-Kunt, “Small and
medium enterprises across the globe. Small Business
Economics”, 29(4), 2007, pp. 415-434.
[27] P. Berrone., C. Cruz, C., L. R. Gómez Mejia, M. Larraza
Kintana, “Socioemotional wealth and corporate responses to institutional pressures: Do family-controlled
firms pollute less?”, Administrative Science Quarterly,
55(1), 2010, pp. 82-113.
[28] L. R. Gómez-Mejia, K. T. Haynes, M. Nu-ez-Nickel, K.
J. L. Jacobson, J. Moyano-Fuentes, “Socioemotional
wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms:
Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills”, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 52 (1), 2007, pp. 106-137.
[29] M. C. Vallejo Martos, “What is a family business? A
discussion of an integrative and operational definition”
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small
Business, 4(4),2007, pp. 473-488.
[30] Friedrichshafener Institut für Familienunternehmen,
Deutschlands nächste Unternehmergeneration, Eine
empirische Untersuchung der Einstellungen, Werte und
Zukunftspläne, 4. Auflage, Stiftung Familienunter-nehmen, 2017.

[31] BSI, Federal Office for Information Security, Standard
200-2 - IT-Grundschutz-Methodik, 2017.
[32] IIA (The Institute of Internal Auditors): The Three
Lines of Defense in Effective Risk Management and
Control, position paper, 2013, p.1.
[33] OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Digital Risk Management for Economic
and Social Prosperity, 2015.
[34] T. Kosub, „Components and challenges of integrated
cyber risk management”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Versicherungswissenschaft, Vol. 104, No. 5, pp. 615634.
[35] P. Taveras, “Cyber Risk Management, Procedures and
Considerations to Address the Threats of a Cyber Attack”, Proceedings of the ForenSeccure: Cybersecurity
and Forensics Conference, Chicago, 2019, pp. 1-10.
[36] R. Giebichenstein, C. A. Schirp, Step-by-step: Vorgehehensweise und praktische Umsetzung der ISO 27001,
für Unternehmen, Compliance Berater, Vol. 4, 2015,
pp. 108-113.
[37] Neufeld/Schemmel, „Notfallmanagement bei CyberAngriffen durch Cyber-Incident Response Plan“,
Datenschutz-Berater 2017, pp. 209 - 211.
[38] M. Wilson, J. Hash, “Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program, NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special
Publication 800-50, 2003.
[39] K. Huang, K. Pearlson, “For What Technology Can’t
Fix: Building a Model of Organizational Cybersecurity
Culture, Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, 2019, pp. 6398-6407.
[40] V. Hooper, J. McKissack, „The emerging role of the
CISO”, Business Horizons, Vol. 59, No. 6, 2016, pp.
585-591.
[41] D. Ashenden, A. Sasse, “CISOs and organizational culture: Their own worst enemy?”, Computers & Security,
39, 2013, pp. 396-405.
[42] C. Hardy, “Understanding power: `bringing about strategic change`”, Br J Manage (Special Issue), 1996, pp.
3-16.
[43] P. Berrone, C. Cruz, and L.R. Gomez-Mejia, “Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms: Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future
Research”, Family Business Review 25 (3), 2012, pp.
258-279
[44] I. Barros, J. Hernangómez, N. Martin-Cruz, “Familiness
and socioemotional wealth in Spanish family firms: An
empirical examination”, European Journal of Family
Business, 7 (1-2), pp. 14-24.
[45] M. R. W. Hiebl, “Risk Aversion in Family Firms: What
do we really know?”, The Journal of Risk Finance, 14
(1), 2013, pp. 49-70.
[46] L. R. Gomez-Mejia, C. Cruz, P. Berrone, and J. De Castro “The bind that ties. Socioemotional Wealth preservation in internet family firms”, The Academy of Management Annals, 5:1, 2011, pp. 653-707.
[47] D. García-Pérez-de-Lema, A. Duréndez,, “Managerial
behaviour of small and medium-sized family businesses: an empirical study”, International Journal of
Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, Vol. 13 No. 3,
2007, pp. 151-172.

Page 6224

[48] P. Ulrich, “ Integration von Risikoaspekten in operative
Planung und Budgetierung: Was unterscheidet mittelständische Familienunternehmen von anderen Unternehmen?," Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp 13-33.
[49] S. Behringer, P. Ulrich, A. Unruh, “Compliance Management in Family Firms – a Systematic Literature
Analysis“, Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 17,
No. 1, pp. 140-157.
[50] J. S. Armstrong, T. S. Overton, “Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys”, Journal of marketing research, Vol 14., No. 3, pp. 396-402.
[51] P. Westhead, P. Cowling, “Family firm research: the
need for a methodological rethink”, Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 31-56.
[52] J.H. Astrachan, S.B. Klein, K.X. Smyrnios, “The FPEC Scale of Family Influence: A Proposal for Solving
the Family Business Definition Problem”, Family Business Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 45-58.
[53] W.G. Dyer, “The family: the missing variable in organizational research”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 401-416.
[54] M.R.W. Hiebl, C. Duller, B. Feldbauer-Durstmüller, P.
Ulrich, “Family Influence and Management Accounting Usage–Findings from Germany and Austria”,
Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp.
368-404.
[55] G. Speckbacher, P. Wentges, “The impact of family
control on the use of performance measures in strategic
target setting and incentive compensation: A research
note”, Management Accounting Review, Vol. 23. No.
1, pp. 34–46.

Page 6225

